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Last term, a divided United States Supreme Court invalidated
the replevin statutes of Pennsylvania and Florida. In Fuentes v.
Shevinl and Parham v. Cortese' (the Replevin Cases), the Court held
these statutes unconstitutional insofar as they authorized repossession
of collateral through state officials before the debtor was notified of the
attempted repossession and accorded an opportunity to be heard on
the merits of the creditor's claim. The Replevin Cases involved typical
consumer purchases of household pods,' and accordingly raised new
questions about the basic relationship between secured creditors and
consumer debtors—a relationship upon which our consumer credit
economy is based. Creditors have traditionally regarded the right to
immediate repossession of collateral after determining the debtor to
be in default as the essence of personal property security arrange-
ments,' and their standard-form security agreements typically spell
out this right. One of the main reasons this pre-judgment procedure is
so highly valued is that the threat of repossession is a principal means
of obtaining payment on an installment sales contract.'
The Replevin Cases are also significant in that they constitute
another chapter in the current reappraisal, precipitated by Sniadach
* Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Georgia School of Law; B.S.,
Spring Hill College, 1963; LL.B., University of Virginia, 1966.
1 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
2 407 U.S. 67 (1972). The appellants also contended that the statutes violated
Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures under cases
such as Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), but the Court did not reach
this question, and it will not be discussed here. 407 U.S. at 71 n.2. The standing of re-
possession under the Fourth Amendment is likewise not considered in this article.
8 In Fuentes, the creditor, through a local deputy sheriff, repossessed a gasoline
stove and a stereophonic phonograph that had been purchased under a conditional sales
contract. The debtor had refused to continue making the installment payments because
of a dispute arising over the servicing of the stove. 407 U.S. at 70-71, Parham involved
the seizure of a bed, a table and other household goods seized under writs of replevin.
As in Fuentes, the property repossessed in Parham had been purchased under conditional
sales contracts, and the debtors had fallen behind in their installment payments. Id. at
71-72.
4 The courts sometimes agree. See Murdock v. Blake, 26 Utah 2d 22, 29, 484 P.2d
164, 169 (1971), where the court noted that "the most important remedy available to a
secured party is the right to take possession of the collateral following a debtor's default."
See also Goodman v. Schulman, 144 Misc. 512, 514-15, 258 N.Y.S. 681, 683-84 (N.Y. City
Ct. 1932) ; Hogan, The Secured Party and Default Proceedings Under the U.C.C., 47
Kum. L. Rev. 205, 211 (1962); and Comment, Nonjudicial Repossession—Reprisal in
Need of Reform, 11 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 435 (1970).
5 For judicial recognition of the frequent use of the self-help procedure see Southern
Indus. Say. Bank v. Greene, 224 So. 2d 416, 418 (Fla. Ct. App. 1969).
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v. Family Finance Corp., 6 of pre-judgment procedures utilized to deny
individuals of property and other interests. Following the Supreme
Court's holding in Sniadach that pre-judgment garnishment of wages
without notice or opportunity for hearing violated "the fundamental
principles of due process," 7 a variety of governmental processes have
been successfully attacked as constituting a violation of due process.
Summary termination or suspension of entitlements as diverse as wel-
fare benefits8 and driving licenses' have been barred. Further, repu-
,
tation," parenthood,' 1 and access to the judicial process" have all been
found by the Court to be interests which—at least in some circum-
stances—require procedural protection from governmental impair-
ment. Other courts have grappled with a proliferation of suits chal-
lenging traditional creditor's remedies ranging from the landlord's
distress for rent' to a utility's termination of service on nonpayment."
The Replevin Cases have clearly extended the scope of Sniadach.
The question still remains as to what form the Sniadach doctrine, as
interpreted by the Court in the Replevin Cases, will take in the future,
and whether the doctrine will be still further extended. The Replevin
Cases by implication left the door open for the Court to apply Sniadach
to the "self-help" repossession provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code," and by such application to find this form of pre-judgment
seizure violative of the Fourteenth Amendment as the Pennsylvania and
Florida replevin statutes had been found to be.
The Pennsylvania and Florida replevin statutes struck down in
the Replevin Cases authorized repossession of collateral by state offi-
cials, usually local sheriffs. This judicial repossession" must be dis-
6
 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
7
 Id. at 342.
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
0 Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
10
 Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
11 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
12
 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
18 Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
14 Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972).
15
 Uniform Commercial Code 44 9-503, -504 (1962 Official Text). Reference is to the
1962 Official Text since the edition served as a model for many state enactments. Only
minor differences in repossession procedures are introduced by the 1972 Edition. These
differences are noted in connection with the modified provisions. The provisions of
9-503 are set out in the text at note 70 infra.
16
 A typical example is the Florida statute which was struck down by the Replevin
Cases. Fla. Stat. Ann. 78.01 (Supp. 1972-1973) provides:
Right to replevin—Any person whose goods or chattels are wrongfully detained
by any other person or officer may have a writ of replevin to recover them and
any damages sustained by reason of the wrongful caption or detention as herein
provided. Or such person may seek like relief, but with summons to defendant
instead of replevy writ in which event no bond is required and the property
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tinguished from the "self-help" repossession provided for in sections
9-503 and 9-504 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Self-help reposses-
sion is private in the sense that a state statute merely authorizes the
creditor, on default of the debtor, to seize the secured collateral." At
no time are any judicial or law enforcement officials involved in the
repossession, as was the case with the statutes involved in the Replevin
Cases. Notwithstanding this dissimilarity, the two forms of reposses-
sion are similar in one crucially important regard—neither procedure
affords the debtor notice of the proposed taking or any opportunity to
dispute the merits of the creditor's claim until after the property has
been repossessed. It is the submission of this article that the similarities
between judicial repossession and self-help repossession are by far
greater than the differences. It will be argued that this similarity re-
quires similar treatment for self-help repossession under Sniadach and
the Replevin Cases, and a concomitant finding that self-help reposses-
sion violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The contention that self-help repossession is violative of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not without its judicial
adherents. In Adams v. Egley," the United States District Court for
the Southern District of California held that self-help repossession,
provided for in sections 9503 and 9504 of the California Commercial
Code," was unconstitutional, reasoning that Sniadach was "a return
of the 'entire domain of prejudgment remedies to the long standing
shall be seized only after judgment, such judgment to be in like form as that pro-
vided when defendant has retaken the property on a forthcoming bond. . . .
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 78.07 (Supp. 1972-1973) provides:
Bond; Requisites—Before a replevy writ issues, plaintiff shall file a bond with
surety payable to defendant to be approved by the clerk in at least double the
value of the property to be replevied conditioned that plaintiff will prosecute
his action to effect and without delay and that if defendant recovers judgment
against him in the action, he will return the property, if return thereof is ad-
judged, and will pay defendant all sums of money recovered against plaintiff by
defendant in the action.
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 78,08 (Supp. 1972-1973) provides:
Writ; form; return—The writ shall command the officer to whom it may be
directed to replevy the goods and chattels in possession of defendant, describing
them, and to summon the defendant to answer the complaint.
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 78.13 (Supp. 1972-1973) provides:
Writ; disposition of property levied on—The officer executing the writ shall
deliver the property to plaintiff after the lapse of three (3) days from the time
the property was taken unless within the three (3) days defendant gives bond
with surety to be approved by the officer in double the value of the property
. , conditioned to have the property forthcoming to abide the result of the
action, in which event the property shall be redelivered to defendant.
17 See Coogan, The New UCC Article 9, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 477, 564 (1973).
18 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-1484, 9th Cir. Feb.
29, 1972.
19 Cal. Commercial Code § 9503-04. (West 1964). These provisions are almost
verbatim adoptions of U.C.C. § 9-503 and 9-504.
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procedural due process principle which dictates that except in extraor-
dinary circumstances, an individual may not be deprived of his life,
liberty, or property without notice and hearing.' " 20
Inasmuch as Adams has invalidated sections 9-503 and 9-504
of the Uniform Commercial Code, the decision has invited exten-
sive discussion commenting upon the merits of the decision in light of
Sniadach and the Replevin Cases.' A crucial question, as of yet un-
answered, concerns the effect of Adams on the creditor-debtor relation-
ship: will Adams afford the debtor significant due process protections?
Adams must be carefully re-evaluated in light of this query, since the
extension of the Replevin Cases to self-help repossession could, from
the standpoint of the consumer, provide only token due process pro-
tections. It will be submitted that a reduction of due process protection
to mere due process tokenism could be effected by a liberal construc-
tion of waiver clauses, allowance of only a short time period between
notice to the debtor and the actual hearing, or limiting the hearing
solely to a determination of the debtor's default.
This article will begin with a discussion of Sniadach and the
Replevin Cases. Then the article will focus on two aspects of Adams
v. Egley. First, the propriety of extending the scope of the Replevin
Cases to the self-help repossession sections of the Code will be ex-
amined. Second, the extent of due process protection provided by an
extension of the Replevin Cases to Adams will be analyzed, with care-
ful attention given to the potential for limiting this protection through
judicial laxity regarding waiver and notice requirements.
I. OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD
A. The Scope of Sniadach
Prior to Sniadach the courts did not appear to be troubled by the
constitutional standing of traditional pre-judgment remedies. Justice
Holmes wrote in Coffin Bros. v. Bennett: "Nothing is more common
than to allow parties alleging themselves to be creditors to establish
in advance by attachment a lien dependent for its effect upon the result
of the suit." 22 In Coffin Bros., the Court upheld a Georgia statute
empowering the State Superintendent of Banks to issue execution
against the property of stockholders of a closed bank when the stock-
holders failed to pay assessments due on their securities. Similarly,
the Court in Ownbey v. Morgan" sustained a Delaware foreign attach-
20 338 F. Stipp. at 618.
21 See, e.g., Uniform Commercial Code Commentary, 13 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev
1503 (1972), and Note, 3 Loyola L.J. 451 (1972).
22 277 U.S. 29, 31 (1928).
23 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
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ment statute requiring the non-resident defendant resisting a $200,000
claim to post security before he could plead or obtain the release of
his stock which had been summarily seized. The Court's assumption
regarding the economic position of the party whose property is at-
tached—an assumption that appeared to be an essential part of the
Court's reasoning—surfaced in a pregnant aside:
The condition imposed has a reasonable relation to the con-
version of a proceeding quasi in rem into an action in per-
sonam; ordinarily it is not difficult to comply with—a man
who has property usually has friends and credit—and hence
in its normal operation it must be regarded as a permissible
condition . . . . 24
Against this background the Court, in McKay v. Mclnnes,28
needed only a per curiam citation of Coffin Bros. and Ownbey to sup-
port its affirmance of a decision by the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine" upholding that state's general attachment statute. The statute
allowed pre-judgment seizure of property in all types of civil actions
without requiring even the posting of security by the plaintiff. Ad-
mitting that the procedure deprived the defendant of the use of his
property, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court concluded, however, that
no deprivation of constitutional rights occurred because the seizure was
conditional, temporary, and part of an established legal proceeding 2 7
McKay, then, signified an acceptance by the Supreme Court of the
notion that temporary takings of property effected by summary pro-
cedures did not constitute unconstitutional deprivations."
That acceptance, however, did not survive Sniadach, which pre-
sented a nearly perfect case to deemphasize the distinction protecting
temporary deprivations from attachment on constitutional grounds.
That case presented not a stockholder resisting a claim of a creditor or




279 U.S. 820 (1928).
127 Me. 110, 141 A. 699 (1928).
Id, at 116, 141 A. at 702-03. The Maine Court concluded:
[Dieprivation does not require actual physical taking of the property or thing
itself. It takes place when the free use and enjoyment of the thing or the power
to dispose of it at will are affected.
But, although an attachment may, within the broad meaning of the pre-
ceding definition, deprive one of property, yet conditional and temporary as it
is, and part of the legal remedy and procedure by which the property of a
debtor may be taken in satisfaction of the debt, if judgment be recovered, we do
not think it is the deprivation of the property contemplated by the Constitution.
Id. (emphasis added).
28 For a further discussion of the "temporary deprivation" concept see Shell Oil Co.
v. Mine, 246 A.2d 837 (Vt. 1968), and Byrd v. Rector, 112 W. Va. 192, 163 5.E. 845
(1932). See also Note, Attachment and Garnishment. Constitutional Law, Due Process of
Law, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 986, 992 (1970).
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regulatory agency, but a worker resisting the pre-hearing garnishment
of her wages by a finance company. Justice Douglas' opinion for the
Court illustrated that the freezing of the defendant's wages by sum-
mary judicial process constituted a "taking" of property under the
Due Process Clause even though it was temporary in nature. Drawing
on both congressional investigations and law review commentary, he
stressed the hardship imposed by the wage garnishment procedure
which gives the creditor leverage over the only income of the average
debtor." Since the garnishment is capable of driving "a wage-earning
family to the wall," he concluded that it was an "obvious" taking of
property under the Fourteenth Amendment."
Justice Harlan was also convinced as to the constitutional inade-
quacy of prejudgment garnishment procedures, but for different rea-
sons. Casting aside McKay as an "unexplicated per curiam,"i he
argued that prior cases involving adequacy of service" and admin-
istrative procedures" established, except where special governmental
interests were present, that opportunity for hearing was required
before any taking of property not de minimis in nature. Such a pro-
cedure was "part of the Anglo-American legal heritage"" and was
aimed at establishing "the validity, or at least the probable validity, of
the underlying claim" before depriving the debtor of his property."
Justice Harlan's concurrence, explicating his view of the doctrine
of due process as established by precedent, appears to have been
prompted in large measure by the only dissent in Sniadach, that of
Justice Black. Any attempt to give content to the Due Process Clause
apart from the specifics of the Constitution, concluded Justice Black,
amounted to invocation of "Natural Law."" Stressing that Mrs. Sni-
adach had not shown that the garnishment had imposed hardship on
her personally, he was content with the distinction between temporary
and constitutional takings of property propounded by the Maine court
in McKay."
The language of the Sniadach opinion produced predictable and
28 Justice Douglas reasoned: "The leverage of the creditor on the wage earner is
enormous." 395 U.S. at 341. He concluded that there were many "grave injustices made
possible by prejudgment garnishment whereby the sole opportunity to be heard comes
after the taking." Id. at 340.
88 Id. at 341-42.
81 Id. at 344 (concurring opinion).
82 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
83 Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126 (1941); United States v.
Illinois Cent. R. Co., 291 U.S. 457 (1934); Londoner v. City & County of Denver, 210
U.S. 373 (1908).
84 395 U.S. at 343.
88 Id.
88 Id. at 351 (dissenting opinion).
87 Id. at 348-49.
442
SELF-HELP REPOSSESSION
a sharp disagreement as to its meaning and implications. Some lower
courts read the case as applying only to wage garnishments and sim-
ilar situations involving "special irreversible economic hardships.""
This view enabled them to sustain replevin statutes" and garnishments
unrelated to wages.' On the other hand, several courts, stressing Jus-
tice Harlan's concurrence, viewed Sniadach as a general mandate for
notice and hearing before any taking of property, absent special gov-
ernmental interests. These courts applied notice and hearing require-
ments in cases dealing with garnishments of bank accountsfi and
receivables" as well as with replevin and similar statutes." Still other
tribunals attempted to follow a middle course, finding the decision
applicable only when necessities of life are threatened, but broadly
defining necessities to embrace most consumer possessions."
The Replevin Cases provided the Supreme Court with an excellent
opportunity to delineate those circumstances to which Sniadach should
aa 300 West 154th St. Realty Co. v. Department of Buildings, 26 N.Y.2d 538, 260
N.E.2d 534, 311 N.Y.S.2d 899 (1970). In this case, the Board of Health of the City of
New York ordered, by statutory authority, a tenant to pay over a certain amount of his
rent to the Board to abate a nuisance in the tenant's apartment, i.e., to repair a broken
toilet. The landlord was not given an opportunity to assert his non-liability as to the
nuisance until after the rents had been turned over to the Board. The New York Court
of Appeals rejected the landlord's claim that the extrajudicial collection of rent violated
his right to due process of law, holding that "[Oho instant procedure involves none of
the special irreversible economic hardships requiring prior judicial proceedings, as does
wage garnishment . . . ." Id. at 544, 260 N.E.2d at 537, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 903.
89 Brunswick Corp. v. J&P Inc., 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970). Also in this category
are two three-judge court rulings: Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970),
and Epps v. Cortese, 326 F. Supp. 127 (ED. Pa. 1971), both of which were reversed in
the Replevin Cases.
4o E.g., TermPlan Inc. v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 270, 463 P.2d 68 (1969); Reeves
v. Motor Contract Co., 324 F. Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
41 Larson v. Fetherston, 44 Wise. 2d 712, 172 N.W.2d 20 (1969).
42 Jones Press, Inc. v. Motor Travel Serv., Inc., 286 Minn. 205, 176 N.W.2d 87
(1970).
4a Randone v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709
(1971) (attachment); Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d. 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42
(1971) (claim and delivery).
44 E.g., Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
In Laprease, the plaintiff had purchased a bed and mattress, a chest, a dinette set, and
other household furnishings from the defendant under a conditional sales contract. The
plaintiff defaulted on her payments, and the defendant sought to repossess the property,
agreeing, however, to hold seizure in abeyance if the plaintiff would make certain pay-
ments on the contract. The plaintiff sought a temporary restraining order and an in-
junction, alleging that she was unable to make the stipulated payment and consequently
was in danger of having the property in question repossessed by the defendant.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York held that
the prehearing seizure of the property involved, authorized by statute, violated the due
process clause. The court reasoned that "[Weds, stoves, mattresses, dishes, tables and
other necessaries for ordinary day-to-day living are, like wages in Sniadach, a 'specialized
type of property presenting distinct problems in our economic system,' the taking of
which on the unilateral command of an adverse party 'may impose tremendous hard-
ships' on purchasers of these essentials." Id. at 722.
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apply. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, reasoned that "[a]ny
significant taking of property by the State is within the purview of
the Due Process Clause" Further, Sniadach was not a "radical de-
parture from established principles of procedural due process."' ° Al-
though implicitly acknowledging that many prior cases had limited
Sniadach according to the importance of the articles of property re-
plevied, the Court concluded:
No doubt, there may be many gradations in the "importance"
or "necessity" of various consumer goods. Stoves could be
compared to television sets, or beds could be compared to
tables. But if the root principle of procedural due process is
to be applied with objectivity, it cannot rest on such distinc-
tions. The Fourteenth Amendment speaks of "property"
generally.47
Hence, according to the Replevin Cases, the Court felt that it was not
the character of the property but the importance of "[a] fair process
of decision-making" which brought the constitutional principle of due
process into operation." Only by testing the validity of the creditor's
claim through notice and opportunity for hearing could the debtor
receive protection from unfair or mistaken deprivations. Bonding
requirements at most tested only the strength of the creditor's belief
in his possession. Prior hearings should and would be required before
any deprivation occurred—even one temporary in nature—except in
extraordinary situations where prompt action is needed to "secure an
important governmental or general public interest"" and strict control
over the summary seizure power is maintained by public officials. 5°
Typical replevin statutes serve no such interest, the Court concluded,
inasmuch as they are concerned with "private gain" and the minimiza-
tion of creditor costs."
Justice White, dissenting, saw an entirely different constitutional
and economic landscape. 52
 Past cases, he wrote, "provide no automatic
45 407 U.S. at 86.
40
 Id. at 88.
47 Id. at 89-90.
48 Id. at 81.
49 Id. at 91.
ao Id.
51
 Id. at 92 & n.29.
52 Justice White was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun. Justices
Powell and Rehnquist took no part in the case. The dissent also argued that since the
plaintiffs had adequate remedies at law in proceedings that were still pending in the
state courts, under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the district courts' judgments
should have been vacated. 407 U.S. at 99. The majority rejected this view, arguing that
Younger was not applicable insofar as the appellants had sought only declaratory relief,
not injunctions against pending or future state court proceedings. Id. at 71 n.3. "
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test for determining whether and when due process of law requires
adversary proceedings" The seller as well as the buyer has property
interests to be protected "until the purchase price is fully paid, the
seller early in the transaction often having more at stake than the
buyer."54 To Justice White, the question should be only whether or
not the buyer has failed to make his payments; if not, "it would seem
not only 'fair,' but essential that the creditor be allowed to repossess.'
It is unlikely that the creditor will be mistaken or unfair because it
is proper to rely on the accuracy and fairness of the creditor's answer
to this one factual question—i.e., whether the debtor has defaulted—
since "dollar and cents considerations weigh heavily against false
claims of default." Accordingly, Justice White would sustain those
replevin statutes under which the collateral is merely "placed in cus-
tody and immobilized" pending final determination of the creditor's
claim." In short, the minority is willing to permit temporary depriva-
tions in circumstances where the probability of unfair claims is low
and both creditor and debtor have economic interests in the property.
In sum, the Replevin Cases did not fully resolve the diverse in-
terpretations Sniadach engendered. However, with the decision in
Adams v. Egley," the crucial area of dispute appears to have shifted
from judicial repossession embodied in replevin statutes to the self-help
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code. At this point, then, the
mechanics of self-help repossession must be explained to facilitate a
complete understanding of Adams and the questions and problems that
that case may raise.
B. The Process of Self-help Repossession and
Adams v. Egley
The legal framework governing most self-help repossessions is
established in Part 5 of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Section 9-503 provides:
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the
right to take possession of the collateral. In taking possession
a secured party may proceed without judicial process if this
can be done without breach of peace or may proceed by
action."
53 Id. at 101.
54 Id. at 99 (emphasis added).
65 Id. at 100.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
ao U.C.C.	 9-503.
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The Code itself does not require any notice to the debtor prior to the
repossession." The right to recapture arises automatically upon "de-
fault," a term which the Code does not attempt to define. In practice,
however, the creditor will normally send a series of notices demanding
payment before declaring the entire debt due and proceeding to seize
the collateral. Following repossession, the secured party may dispose
of the collateral at public or private sale. All aspects of this sale must
he "commercially reasonable,"" but the Code does not impose a defini-
tion of commercial reasonableness any more demanding than "con-
formity with reasonable commercial practices among dealers in the
type of property sold."' Except where the collateral is perishable or
threatens to decline rapidly in value, the secured party must send the
debtor "reasonable notification" of the time and place of the proposed
public sale or of the time after which a private sale is to be made."
The debtor may then redeem the collateral before such sale by tender-
ing fulfillment of all obligations," or may seek to have the disposition
"ordered or restrained on appropriate terms and conditions" if the
secured party fails to comply with the statutory rules." In addition,
the debtor may seek damages for loss caused by non-compliance with
these rules." If a debtor is able to establish a violation of the statutory
repossession procedures he is automatically entitled to "the credit
service charge plus ten per cent of the principal amount of the debt
or the time price differential plus ten per cent of the cash price.""
The Code's repossession framework is designed to give flexibility
to the creditor. The crucial term "default" is normally defined in the
security agreement prepared by or on behalf of the creditor." Along
with failure to make scheduled payments, other grounds such as gen-
eral insecurity are typically stated. Unlike the replevin statutes struck
down in the Replevin Cases, the Code does not require a posting of
security prior to seizure, nor does it provide the debtor alleging wrong-
ful repossession a method of obtaining return of the property pending
a trial of his claim. Following the seizure, the financier chooses the
method of disposition subject, under section 9-504, only to the general
standard of commercial reasonableness."
69 Weaver v. O'Meara Motor Co., 452 P.2d 87 (Alas. 1969); Phil Phillips Ford, Inc.
v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 7 U.C.C. Rptr. 952 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970)
61 U.C.C. g 9-504.
62 U.C.C. § 9-507(2).
69 U.C.C. g 9-504(3).
04 U.C.C. § 9-506.
65 U.C.C. § 9-507.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 See 2 W. Willier & F. Hart, Forms and Procedures Under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code 92.40 (1971).
69 U.C.C. I 9-504(1).
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From the above outline, it would appear that self-help repossession
is in every sense "private" and that the state, at most, is no more than
a neutral observer. The court in Adams v. Egley, however, was not
persuaded by this proposition. In Adams, the plaintiff borrowed a sum
of money from a bank and executed a promissory note and security
agreement on several automobiles in favor of the bank. The terms of
the security agreement provided that
the secured party shall also have all of the rights and rem-
edies of a Secured Party under the California Uniform Com-
mercial Code . . . . Without limiting the generality of the
foregoing, upon the occurrence of any such event of default
the Secured Party is entitled to take possession of the vehicle
and to take such other measures as Secured Party may deem
necessary for the protection of the vehicle."
Subsequently, the plaintiff failed to make the installment pay-
ments required by the promissory note and the bank then took pos-
session of two of the vehicles that had served as security under the
security agreement. The automobiles were ultimately sold by the bank
at a private sale."
The plaintiff in Adams argued that sections 9503 and 9504 of
the California Commercial Code," providing for summary repossession
of secured property, authorized an unconstitutional taking of property
without due process of law." The defendant, on the other hand, con-
tended that the alleged wrongful acts did not come within the purview
of the Fourteenth Amendment inasmuch as "state action" was not
involved. This was true, the defendant creditor argued, because the
self-help . repossession utilized was based on a private contract whose
terms were wholly self-executing, unlike the wage garnishment pro-
cedure in Sniadach which required a court order."
The Adanis court was not persuaded by the defendant's argu-
ments. Conceding that the repossessions complained of were ostensibly
70 338 F. Supp. at 616.
71 Id. The other plaintiff in the consolidated action had borrowed two separate sums
of money from a credit union to purchase a truck and an automobile. With both loans,
the plaintiff executed promissory notes and security agreements, pledging the truck and
automobile as security. The terms of both agreements provided that "in the event of
default of any term or condition of this security agreement, or the promissory note afore-
said, Secured Party shall be entitled to immediate possession of said . . property ac-
cording to law." Id. The credit union repossessed the automobile and truck after the
plaintiff failed to meet his required payments.
72 Sections 9503 and 9504 of the California Commercial Code (West 1964) are, with
a few exceptions, verbatim adoptions of §§ 9-503 and 9-504 of the Uniform Commercial
Code.
la 338 F. Supp. at 617.
74 Id.
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private acts authorized by contract, the court nevertheless concluded
that the self-help repossession statute had a significant influence on the
provisions of that contract and argued that the defendant creditors
were " 'persuaded or induced to include' repo-ssession by the fact that
such repossession was permitted by statute."'" Based on these observa-
tions, the Adams court reasoned that the
Commercial Code sections set forth a state policy, and the
security arguments upon which the instant actions rest, whose
terms are authorized by the statute and which incorporate its
provisions are merely an embodiment of that policy. It is
therefore apparent that the acts of repossession . . . are
sufficient state action to raise a federal question."
Overcoming this preliminary hurdle, the Adams court then concluded
that Sniadach necessitated a finding that the self-help repossessions
in question violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."
Since the application of Sniadach to self-help repossession appears
to turn solely on the question of state action," this portion of the
Adams holding must be examined in more detail. The court's state
action analysis was based on Reitman v. Mulkey." In Reitman, a
provision of the California Constitution prohibited any restriction on
the right of a person to sell property to any other person he might
choose." The United States Supreme Court affirmed an opinion of the
California Supreme Court that found the constitutional provision to
be a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ments' Examining the potential impact of the constitutional provision,
the Court argued that the intent of the section was to authorize racially
discriminatory behavior in the housing market and that a basic policy
of the state now sanctioned this right to discriminate. Based on this
observation, the Court concluded that the constitutional provision
would "significantly encourage and involve the state in private dis-
78 Id.
76 Id. at 618.
77
 See text at note 18 supra.
78
 See Coogan, The New UCC Article 9, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 477, 564 (1973).
79
 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
80
 Art. I, 26, of the California Constitution provides that
	 •
[n]either the state nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit or
abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of any person, who is willing or desires
to sell, lease or rent any part or all of his real property, to decline to sell, lease
or rent such property to such person or persons as he, in his absolute discretion,
chooses.
81
 387 U.S. at 381.
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criminations" so as to constitute state action under the Fourteenth
Amendment."
Any analysis of state action, as the Court in Reitman noted,
would be incomplete without a discussion of Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority.88 In Burton, a municipal parking authority con-
structed a public parking facility with cash grants from the municipal-
ity and the proceeds from the issuance of revenue bonds. To help meet
debt service requirements, the authority leased a portion of the prem-
ises to a corporation to be used as a restaurant. The authority agreed,
among other things, to complete construction of the facility including
decorative finishings such as ceramic tile floors and wrought iron
railings. Further, the authority agreed to furnish heat, gas service
and all necessary structural repairs at its expense."
After the parking facility was constructed and the restaurant was
open for business, the plaintiff in Burton was denied service in the
restaurant on the basis of his race. The United States Supreme Court,
holding that the alleged acts of discrimination fell within the purview
of the Fourteenth Amendment, reached significant conclusions re-
garding state action. The Court reasoned that a determining test for
the recognition of state action would be a difficult, if not impossible,
task,'" and that "[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing circumstances
can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be
attributed its true significance."" Analyzing the relationship between
the restaurant and the parking authority, the Court found significant
state action from the fact that the authority had "elected to place its
power, property and prestige"87 behind the acts of discrimination.
State action, then, in terms of Burton, is the aggregate of the different
factors of state involvement."'
In the context of Adams and self-help repossession, Reitman and
Burton are not without significance. These two latter cases stand for
the proposition that state action will not turn on the presence or ab-
sence of active state participation; on the contrary, state action will
be found where a state, through statutory law, encourages an activity
or places its governmental power and prestige behind an activity or
practice."
82 Id.
Be 365 U.S. 715 (1960 .
84 Id. at 719-20.
85 Id. at 722.
88 Id.
87 Id.
88 See Developments in the Law, Equal Protection, 82 Rarv. L. Rev. 1067, 1069
(1969).
80 See also Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963), and Lombard v.
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In light of the above considerations, it is submitted that reliance
by the Adams court on the state action principles enunciated in Reit-
man was not misplaced. In both cases active state participation was
lacking, but the vice in Adams was the same as that in Reitman—the
authorization and encouragement of an activity or practice by state
policy embodied in statutory law. To conclude that the state action
principles enunciated in the civil rights context of Reitman are inap-
plicable to the debtor-creditor relationship would require accepting
two separate state action tests under the Fourteenth Amendment and
an anomalous hierarchy of constitutional rights in which equal pro-
tection claims would enjoy precedence over due process claims."
II. MINIMUM DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS—DUE
PROCESS TOKENISM
As the above analysis suggests, it would not be unreasonable for
the Supreme Court to conclude that self-help repossession, as embodied
in section 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code, constitutes suffi-
cient state action so as to bring the practice within the purview of the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Such an extension
of Sniadach and the Replevin Cases, however, would not necessarily
afford a consumer debtor protections thought to be the essential requi-
sites of procedural due process. Token due process protections in the
Adams context could be effected by judicial and legislative acceptance
Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963). See also Bullock v. Carter 405 U.S. 134 (1972), and
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
Last term, in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), the Supreme
Court held that the granting of a liquor license to a private club and the attendant
regulation by state alcohol control authorities did not constitute state action such as
would subject the club to the equal protection restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment.
For a discussion of Moose Lodge see The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 Harv. L. Rev.
70 (1972).
ix)
 Contra: Oiler v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972), where the
court, in a fact situation identical to that in Adams, concluded that {§ 9503 and 9504 of
the California Commercial Code did not embody the requisite state action required for
a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court in Oiler
concluded that Reitman was inapplicable because "Mlle historical, legal and moral
considerations fundamental to extending federal jurisdiction to meet racial injustices are
simply not present in the instant case." Id. at 23. See also McCormick v. First Nat'l
Bank, 322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1971). Other lower federal courts have refused to
apply Reitman to the Code's self-help repossession provisions on the ground that these
provisions represent a codification of long-standing common law doctrine rather than a
sudden intervention as in Reitman. E.g., Kirksey v. Theilig, 351 F. Supp. 727 (D. Colo.
1972); Greene v. First Nat'l Exch. Bank, 11 U.C.C. Rptr. 367 (W.D. Va. 1972). This
reasoning appears defective because: (1) it confuses consideration of discriminatory in-
tent under the Equal Protection Clause with the threshold question of whether state
action is present; (2) a right of self-help repossession was not recognized in our system




of liberal waiver provisions, insufficient time spans between notice and
hearing, and hearings limited solely to the issue of debtor default.
A. Waiver
In the Replevin Cases, the contract signed by one of the debtors
provided that "in the event of default of any payment or payments,
Seller at its option may take back the merchandise . . . ." 91 Since, the
creditor argued, the debtor had signed the agreement containing this
clause, she had waived her procedural due process rights and could
not protest the pre-judgment repossession.
The Court, however, was of a contrary opinion and concluded
that the debtor's due process rights had not been waived. In reaching
this position, the Court made several significant observations:
There was no bargaining over contractual terms between the
parties who, in any event, were far from equal in bargaining
power. The purported waiver provision was a printed part
of a form sales contract and a necessary condition of sale.
The [creditor] made no showing whatever that the [debtors]
were actually aware or made aware of the significance of
the fine print now relied upon as a waiver of constitutional
rights."
Concluding that the alleged waiver had not been "voluntarily, intelli-
gently, and knowingly" made, the Court found that the debtor had
not waived her procedural due process rights."
Notwithstanding the fact that the debtors in the Replevin Cases
had been found not to have waived their due process rights, the Court
did not conclude that waiver was impossible in the debtor-creditor
context." Further, Justice White pointed out that it would be relatively
91 407 U.S. at 94. This clause, part of a printed form contract, appeared in small
type and was unaccompanied by any explanation of the meaning of the clause. Id.
02 Id. at 95.
98 Id. The Court pointed out that the language of waiver provisions must at least
be "clear," and that the conditional sales contracts did not include any reference to a
waiver of notice and hearing, nor did the contracts "indicate how or through what
process—final judgment, self-help, prejudgment replevin with a prior bearing, or pre-
judgment replevin without a prior hearing—the seller could take back the goods." Id. at
95-96. Therefore the Court concluded that the above language did not waive the debtors'
constitutional rights. Id.
94 See also D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972), where the Court
upheld a confession of judgment procedure that did not include notice to the debtor, The
Court in the Replevin Cases, however, argued that Overmyer was inapplicable since the
confession of judgment provision in that case had been specifically bargained for by two
corporations during the course of business negotiations and was therefore not a "con-
tract of adhesion." 407 U.S. at 95.
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simple for creditors to utilize repossession by clearly stating in the
credit instrument that the goods could be seized without a hearing
or without employing the judicial process at all."
It would appear, then, that while the self-help repossession pro-
visions of section 9-503 of the Code, absent provisions for notice and
hearing, could be declared a violation of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the possibility of waiving these due process
rights could effectively limit the beneficial features of an application
of Sniadach and the Replevin Cases to Adams." However, the waiver
argument, as the Adams court recognized, can be severely limited by
the relationship between the debtor and his creditor." The Adams
court found it necessary to distinguish a waiver reached through bar-
gaining by parties of equal strength from a situation involving a cred-
itor economically stronger than his debtor so as to be able to dictate
contractual terms through a standard form contract on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis; in the latter case the Adams court found an ineffective
waiver."
As Adams indicates, the scope of waiver of procedural due process
rights in the self-help repossession context is unclear at best. How
the Supreme Court would resolve the question is also unclear, but the
Court has considered the waiver conundrum. In D.H. Overmyer Co.
v. Frick Co.," the Court held a confession of judgment provision in a
contractual agreement between a corporate debtor and a corporate
creditor valid inasmuch as the waiver had been "voluntarily, intelli-
gently, and knowingly made."'" In Overmyer, the Court stressed
that the waiver was the product of negotiated bargaining between
corporate parties of relatively equal economic strengths. However, the
Court in dictum noted that "where the contract is one of adhesion,
where there is great disparity in bargaining power, and where the
debtor receives nothing for the .. . [confession of judgment] pro-
vision, other legal consequences may ensue."101
 Significantly, the
Replevin Cases also noted that unequal bargaining power between
the parties could destroy the effectiveness of a purported waiver of
procedural due process rights.'"
95 Id. at 102.
08 Cf. Coogan, The New UCC Article 9, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 477 (1973). The author
also concludes that "the debtor in an Article 9 transaction may well be put on notice by
the terms of his security agreement that, in the event of defaults the creditor can re-
possess under 9-503 without any notice or hearing." Id. at 565.
97 328 F. Supp. 614 (1972).
98 Id. at 620.
99 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
too Id. at 187.
101 Id. at 188.
102
 407 U.S. at 95. For other cases finding a purported contractual waiver ineffec-
tive see Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970), and Laprease v.
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Notwithstanding the trend in judicial thinking that increasingly
appears to support the proposition that waivers of procedural due
process rights should be disallowed where there "is a great disparity ing power,),ioabargaining	 the Supreme Court has not ruled out the possi-
bility of effective waiver provisions. Should such provisions be ruled
permissible, the application of the Replevin Cases to Adams would
afford a consumer debtor only token protections in the adhesion con-
tract situation, characterized by parties of relatively unequal economic
strengths and a lack of meaningful negotiation and bargaining. If the
debtor could be forced to waive his procedural due process rights
through the utilization of an ordinary standard form contract, the
application of Sniadach and the Replevin Cases to Adams would be
of limited value.
B. Notice and Hearing
As to the form and substance of the notice and hearing require-
ment, the Court in Sniadach made this observation:
[Djue process is afforded only by the kinds of "notice" and
"hearing" which are aimed at establishing the validity, or at
least the probable validity, of the underlying claim against
the alleged debtor before he can be deprived of his property
or its unrestricted use.'"
The Court in the Replevin Case did not expand on what the Sniadach
test would require beyond a statement that a hearing must provide a
"real test."'" The Court did conclude, however, that the substantive
hearing requirements could be satisfied by numerous variations deter-
mined through the legislative process.'"
Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970). See also Coogan, The New
UCC Article 9, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 477, 565-66 (1973), and Uniform Commercial Code
Commentary, 13 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 1503 (1972).
"a 405 U.S. at 188.
104 395 U.S. at 343. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S.
306 (1950). In Mullane, the bank established a common trust fund, with 113 trusts par-
ticipating. Upon termination of an accounting period, the bank petitioned the Surrogates'
Court for settlement of its account as a common trustee. Many of the beneficiaries of the
trusts involved were not residents of the state of New York, but the only notice of the
bank's application given beneficiaries was by publication in a local newspaper in accor-
dance with state banking law.
The United States Supreme Court held that notice by publication was sufficient
as to those beneficiaries whose whereabouts were unknown. However, as to beneficiaries
whose addresses were known to the trustee, notice by publication was insufficient and a
violation of due process of law because "under the circumstances it is not reasonably
calculated to reach those who could easily be informed by other means at hand." Id.
at 319. See also Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 152-53 (1941),
and United States v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 291 U.S. 457, 463 (1934).
1° 407 U.S. at 97.
108 Id. at 96-97.
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While the Court has not clearly delineated notice and hearing
requirements in the debtor-creditor contract, it has made significant
pronouncements, in other areas, as to the required length of time be-
tween notice and hearing and the structural form that a required
hearing could take. In Lindsey v. Norma,'" the Court upheld an Ore-
gon statute that provided that a hearing on a landlord's right to retake
leased premises from a defaulting tenant occur not later than six days
after service of a complaint on the defaulting tenant. The statute
also provided in effect that the triable issues of fact at the hearing
would be limited to a determination as to the defaulting tenant's non-
payment of rent. These two features of the statute, the plaintiff tenants
argued, violated their procedural due process rights, since a six-day
notice requirement would not afford a defaulting tenant an adequate
opportunity to secure legal counsel, and a hearing limited to the issue
of tenant default would not permit the tenant to allege breaches of
the lease by the landlord."'
The Court was not persuaded by the plaintiff's reasoning, and
concluded that neither the six-day notice provision nor the lack of a
full evidentiary hearing violated the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. On the first issue, the Court was not convinced
that the tenant's interests would be adversely affected by a six-day
notice requirement since the tenant would always know whether or
not he was in possession of the premises and in default on rental
payments.'" As to the scope of issues that could be litigated at the
required hearing, the tenant would not be denied due process of law
inasmuch as the tenant was not foreclosed under Oregon law from
bringing his own action for breach of lease covenants by the land-
lord."°
Even though limited to a landlord-tenant situation, Lindsey, in
the context of Adams and the debtor-creditor relationship, could have
significant repercussion. As suggested earlier, the Supreme Court could
extend the rationale of Sniadach and the Replevin Cases to Adams and
require notice and a hearing before self-help repossession could be
utilized. However, the beneficial results of this extension could be
severely limited if the Court sanctioned state statutory law that pro-
vided for short notice and default-only hearing requirements."' A
107 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
108 Id. at 64.
100 Id. at 65. The Court did conclude, however, that "it is possible for this provision
to be applied so as to deprive a tenant of a proper hearing in specific situations, but there
is no showing made here, and possible infirmity in other situations does not render it in-
valid on its face." Id.
110 Id. at 65-66.
111 Some courts have already sanctioned a short notice requirement. See, e.g., Kosches
v. Nichols, 68 Misc. 2d 795, 327 N.Y.S.2d 968 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. City 1971), where the
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limited period between notice and hearing could mean, for many indi-
viduals, the lack of an effective opportunity to be heard inasmuch as
their ability to acquire counsel and to prepare their case adequately
would be impaired. Indeed, as Justice Douglas pointed out in Lindsey,
the difficulty of serving adequate legal representation on a few days
notice could make Sniadach-type notice and hearing requirements
illusory due process protections." Further, the opportunity to litigate
allegations of creditor default only at a future hearing suggests, espe-
cially in the situation where a creditor has breached his warranties of
sale, that the debtor would lose possession of the secured property
without an opportunity adequately to present his side of the story.'
In this situation, then, the application of the principles enunciated in
Sniadach to self-help repossession would certainly be no more than
a token gesture and an illusory procedural due process protection.
III. CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to illustrate and analyze two proposi-
tions. The first, that the self-help repossession provisions of Article 9
constitute sufficient state action such as to be within the purview of
the Fourteenth Amendment, has been wholly endorsed by this article.
The second proposition, however, that the extension of Sniadach and
the Replevin Cases to Adams could provide the consumer debtor with
illusory due process protections, has been suggested so that the prob-
lems raised by the extension can be remedied, as the Court in the
Replevin Cases suggested, by the legislative process. 114
A legislative prescription purporting to remedy any problems
resulting from an extension of Sniadach to self-help repossession would
have to insure that a consumer debtor be afforded full procedural
due process protections. This would mean, first of all, that notice and
hearing procedural rights could not be easily waived where an adhe-
sion contract was utilized by a creditor. Further, the defaulting debtor
should be given sufficient opportunity to secure adequate legal repre-
sentation. Finally, the debtor should be able to raise all available
defenses at the repossession hearing.
court construed Sniadach as permitting only seven days' notice of hearing before a statu-
tory seizure of property,
112 405 U.S. at 85 (dissenting). See also Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091 (ED.
Pa. 1970), aff'd, 405 U.S. 191 (1972), where the district court expressed doubts as to
whether a "20-day notice provision prior to execution of a confessed judgment ..
grants sufficient time to permit a debtor with limited resources to . . . [open or strike
off] a confessed judgment." 314 F. Supp. at 1101.
113 405 U.S. at 85-91.
114 See 407 U.S. at 97 & n.33, where the Court concluded that through the legis-
lative process "leeway remains to develop a form of hearing that will minimize un-
necessary cost and delay while preserving the fairness and effectiveness of the hear-
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